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Toward a Multi-Layered Contract Law for Europe 
 
Jan Smits* 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There is no question that the European Commission’s Communication on European Contract 
Law1 is to be seen as the starting point of a new era in the discussion on a uniform law of contract 
for Europe. Until now, this discussion has been characterised by its academic character: whether a 
uniform or harmonised private law for Europe should be possible and what its contents should be, 
has been debated in the scholarly literature of the last decade. These questions did, however, not 
become important issues for European politics or even for legal practice. Thus, the calls from the 
European Parliament in 1989 and 19942 that work on a European Civil Code should begin, were 
not answered by the Commission or the Council for a long time. This has changed with the 
Tampere European Council of 1999, in which ‘an overall study on the need to approximate 
Member State’s legislation in civil matters’ was summoned.3 Now, the 2001 Communication 
invites all interested parties to give their opinion on the future of contract law in Europe. This 
kick off for a political debate is most important. 
 In this paper, I will discuss one of the options for the future development of European 
contract law as sketched in the Communication. The most interesting options that are sketched in 
the Communication, can be distinguished in the option of a step by step harmonisation of 
consumer contract law (as practiced in the past), the option of creating a binding Code of 
Contracts and finally the option of having an optional set of rules to which Member States or 
even contracting parties can adhere if they wish to do to. In my view, this last option is the most 
interesting one, in view not only of the present state of contract law in Europe, but also in view of 
its desired development. 
 This paper will first discuss the present state of contract law in Europe. In section 2 of the 
paper, several diverging tendencies within this contract law are stressed. Then, in section 3, it is 
pointed out that the now often defended ‘generalising’ approach toward European contract law 
(this is the approach that seeks to formulate ‘principles’ of private law with a view to have 
national legal systems replaced by these – option 2) is not in line with this approach. Section 4 
seeks to find out whether the approach of an ‘Optional Code’ is to be accommodated within 
present-day contract law and, if so, in what way. 
 
2. General View on the Development of European Contract Law: Divergence instead of 
Generalisation 
 
2.1 General 
                                                   
* J.M. Smits is Professor of European Private Law at Maastricht University. 
1 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on European Contract 
Law, COM (2001) 398 final. 
2 EC OJ 1989 C 158/400 and EC OJ 1994 C 205/518. 
3 See the Presidency Conclusions at http://www.europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/oct99_en.pdf. 
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Any discussion on the future of contract law in Europe should start with an assessment of the 
present state of affairs in the national legal systems and at the European level. Present-day 
contract law is after all the basis on which any harmonisation of unification should take place. My 
evaluation of present-day contract law in Europe is entirely different from those who try to draft 
general principles of contract law with a view to have these replace national legal systems. In my 
view, contract law is more characterised by diverging tendencies than by a tendency of genera-
lisation. Leaving aside historical aspects of the development toward a general law of contract 
since the sixteenth century,4 the twentieth century has been witness of increasing divergence in 
contract law. At least four diverging tendencies can be identified in most, if not all, of Europe’s 
legal systems. 
 
2.2 First Diverging Tendency: the Influence of Directives on National Contract Law 
 
In the first place, there is a tendency of divergence on a very practical level. The most successful 
way of Europeanising national contract law has up till now been through the use of European 
directives. Since 1985, a whole range of directives has been issued. These concern in particular 
protection of consumers in the field of doorstep sale,5 consumer credit,6 package travel,7 unfair 
contract terms,8 distance contracts9 and sale of goods10 as well as regulation of self-employed 
commercial agents,11 timeshare,12 electronic commerce13 and combating late payment in 
commercial transactions.14 An ever-greater part of contract law is thus governed by European 
legislation, be it of an often non-consistent15 and sometimes disturbing16 nature. This harmo-
nisation leads away from any generalising approach because contract law at the national level is 
                                                   
4 See J.M. Smits, The Future of European Contract Law: on Diversity and the Temptation of Elegance, 
discussion paper presented at the conference Towards a European Ius Commune in Legal Education and 
Research, Maastricht October 2001. 
5 Council Directive 85/577 of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated 
away from business premises, EC OJ 1985 L 372/31. 
6 Council Directive 87/102 of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit, EC OJ 1987 L 42/48. 
7 Council Directive 90/314 of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and package tours, EC OJ 
1990 L 158/59. 
8 Council Directive 93/13 of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, EC OJ 1993 L 95/29. 
9 Council Directive 97/7 of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts, EC 
OJ 1997 L 144/19. 
10 Council Directive 1999/44 of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and 
associated guarantees, EC OJ 1999 L 171/12. 
11 Council Directive 86/653 of 18 December 1986 on the co-ordination of the laws of the Member States 
relating to self-employed commercial agents, EC OJ 1986 L 382/17. 
12 Council Directive 94/47 of 26 October 1994 on the protection of purchasers in respect of certain aspects 
of contracts relating to the purchase of the right to use immovable properties on a timeshare basis, EC OJ 
1994 L 280/83. 
13 Council Directive 2000/31 of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society service, in 
particular electronic commerce, in the Internal market, EC OJ 2000 L 178/1. 
14 Council Directive 2000/35 of 29 June 2000 on combating late payment in commercial transactions, EC 
OJ 2000 L 200/35. All the above directives have been reproduced in Dutch in J.H.M. van Erp/J.M. Smits 
(eds.), Bronnen Europees privaatrecht, Den Haag: Boom (2001). 
15 Also recognized in the Communication: COM (2001) 398 final, 15 et seq. 
16 See in particular G. Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up 
in New Divergences’, (1998) 61 MLR 11 (on the disturbing effect of the Unfair Terms directive on English 
law). 
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ever less governed by general principles and subdivided into separate parts, each having their 
own rules.17 
This gradually leads to something that is systematically entirely different from national 
contract law as we have known it over the last few centuries. It used to be so that for example 
German, French, Dutch and English contract law were supposed to be governed by general 
principles: common rules governing the formation of contracts, governing the remedies of the 
contracting parties, governing the way of interpretation etc., regardless the type of contract 
involved. The Europeanisation of these national legal systems through directives leads to the 
contrary: not to a uniform, but to a diverse contract law, in which for example important remedies 
in case of breach of consumer contracts for the sale of movable goods18 are governed by different 
rules than these same remedies in case of other contracts (commercial contracts or consumer 
contracts not for the sale of movables). Likewise, the rules governing unfair terms in consumer 
contracts19 are different from the ones governing unfair terms in other types of contracts, as there 
will be in the near future specific rules on the payment of debts for commercial transactions,20 not 
covering consumer transactions. One could also point at the formation of distance contracts21 or at 
the time of formation of contracts by electronic means,22 both regulated in a different way than 
other contracts. This tendency toward divergence is reinforced by the fact that it is the European 
Court of Justice that has the final word on the interpretation of these directives. 
 I find it highly surprising that this fragmentation of contract law through directives is not 
taken into account by the drafters of the PECL or by those who defend any other generalising 
view on contract law. The PECL try to cover all contracts in a generalised way, reminiscent of 
the national private law systems as they have existed for several centuries. Even most of the 
directives that were issued before the publication of the PECL have not been taken into account 
by the drafters. The directive on sale of consumer goods as it has to be implemented by 1 January 
2002, providing a detailed set of rules specifically for consumer sale of movables (including a 
hierarchy of actions), of course gives a much more accurate picture of what a European contract 
law looks like than the PECL (that still adopt the principle of free choice of action in art. 8:101).23 
The other way around, it seems that in drafting directives, the system and terminology of the 
PECL are not taken into account either. 
 
2.3 Second Diverging Tendency: Consumer Contract Law and Business Contract Law: the 
Double Structure of the Law of Contract 
 
A second tendency of divergence in contract law exists of the recognition that over time two 
types of contract law have come to exist in the various national legal systems. These are on the 
one hand a consumer contract law and on the other a specific law of contract for professional 
parties. Apart from the influence of European directives on contract law (mostly in the field of 
                                                   
17 Cf. J.M. Smits, ‘A Principled Approach to European Contract Law?’, (2000) 7 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law (MJ) 221. 
18 Council Directive 1999/44 of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and 
associated guarantees, EC OJ 1999 L 171/12. 
19 Council Directive 93/13 of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, EC OJ 1993 L 95/29. 
20 Council Directive 2000/35 of 29 June 2000 on combating late payment in commercial transactions, EC 
OJ 2000 L 200/35. 
21 Council Directive 97/7 of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of distance contracts, EC 
OJ 1997 L 144/19. According to art. 6 of this directive, a consumer can still withdraw from the contract 
within 7 working days after delivery of the good. 
22 Council Directive 2000/31 of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society service, in 
particular electronic commerce, in the Internal market, EC OJ 2000 L 178/1. 
23 Although the action for price reduction and the concept of fundamental non-performance have been laid 
down in both the PECL (art. 9:401 and art. 8:103 in connection with art. 9:301) and the directive. 
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consumer protection), in the national legal systems a separate consumer contract law has come to 
exist as well. This was put into place by specific statutes (in particular in the field of general 
conditions – like the German AGBG, the French art. L 132-1 ff. of the Code de la Consommation 
and the English Unfair Contract Terms Act – and consumer sale), but also by the national courts 
that tend to protect individual consumers to a much greater extent than they protect professional 
parties in interpreting contract terms, applying good faith, etc. 
 The emergence of a specific consumer contract law as distinguished from a business 
contract law does not come as a surprise. Already in 1952, Kessler has pointed to the ambiguous 
character of contract law:24 on the one hand it guarantees that parties are able to contract in 
freedom by attributing binding force to contracts validly entered into. On the other hand, it also 
regulates this freedom by not allowing every contract to be enforceable. This double structure of 
autonomy and intervention could also be phrased as one of economic rationality (efficiency) on 
the one hand and social rationality (distributive justice) on the other.25 
Thus, part of contract law is governed by the morality of trade.26 If parties contract in 
order to make profit, this has considerable influence on their contractual relationship. In trade, 
one usually does not contract in order to obtain a specific good, but is contract a means to a goal, 
the making of profit. If the debtor does not perform, it is only a case of bad luck: the loss should 
be foreseen and is usually covered by insurance.27 If parties search for this economic rationality 
by making a commercial contract, the law should adjust to their wish. Thus, interpretation of 
contract terms should take place as literally as possible and the role of good faith should be 
restricted. Nineteenth century contract law was developed for this type of contracts. 
 This morality of trade is to be distinguished from the morality of the welfare state. There, 
making profit is not the goal of contracting, but it is to arrange for ‘living, working, life and 
health’.28 If the professional party does not act in conformity with the contract, the well being of 
the individual may be threatened. Here, the law has to be paternalistic to serve its function. This 
new type of contract law is still in its infancy and should be further developed. For both 
moralities distinguished here, deserve to have their own contract law. What does a contract with 
which one wants to make profit have in common with one to ensure enjoying the comfort of 
having a house to live in or having a medical insurance? What has marriage in common with 
buying shares in a company? 
 In any generalising approach toward contract law (such as the one envisaged by the 
Commission on European Contract Law), this double structure of contract law would not come to 
the surface. The PECL are intended to have value for any type of contract, regardless who the 
parties are.29 This type of generalisation conceals the conflict between the two types of contract 
law. This may be done deliberately in order to give the principles universal value, or, in the words 
of Epstein about the people that contract law gives rules for:30 
                                                   
24 F. Kessler, ‘Freiheit und Zwang in nordamerikanischen Vertragsrecht’, Festschrift für Martin Wolff, 
Tübingen: Mohr (1952), 67. 
25 Cf. the writings of T. Wilhelmsson, for example ‘Good Faith and the Duty of Disclosure in Commercial 
Contracting – The Nordic Experience’, in: R. Brownsword/N.J. Hird/G. Howells (eds.), Good Faith in 
Contract, Dartmouth: Ashgate (1999), 165 and Chr. Joerges, The Europeanization of Private Law as a 
Rationalization Process and as a Contest of Disciplines [EUI Working Paper Law No. 94/5], 15. 
26 J. Wightman, Contract: A Critical Commentary, London: Pluto Press (1996), 96 et seq. distinguishes in 
this respect between ‘personal’ and ‘commercial’ contract. 
27 Cf. Wightman (Fn. 26), 97. 
28 ‘Wonen, werken, leven en gezondheid’: see J.B.M. Vranken, Mededelings-, informatie- en onderzoeks-
plichten in het verbintenissenrecht, Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink (1989), nr. 27. 
29 This is different with the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts of 1994, although 
their contents is virtually identical to the PECL. 
30 R. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press (1995), 73 
et seq. 
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‘These people are colorless, odorless, and timeless, of no known nationality, age, race or sex. 
These people are self-conscious abstractions known to be false as representations of people in the 
world, and useful precisely because they are so detached from any grubby set of particulars (…). 
There is a cold, practical logic behind this remorseless search for abstractions. (…) This massive 
oversimplification of the social universe treats all persons as though they are as fungible as the 
letters of the alphabet, and thus ignores or rejects every effort to force the common law to take into 
account the difference between an individual worker of limited means and a huge industrial 
corporation.’ 
 
But even if done deliberately, the effect of it in the European context is doubtful. I do understand 
why, within one national legal system, courts are able to work with these abstractions: because 
they know about the national mentality underlying these. They know in their national context 
when the morality of the market becomes more important than the morality of the welfare state. 
This is the case because contract law’s double structure of efficiency and distributive justice has 
led to a specific national fragile equilibrium that is in accordance with the socio-economic 
constellation of the country involved. This common socio-economic constellation is missing in 
Europe, which probably makes principles too abstract to build a European private law with.31 
 
2.4 Third Diverging Tendency: the Diversity of Sources of European Private Law 
 
Another tendency that rather leads to divergence than to unity in contract law, has to do with the 
sources that European private law is made up of. These sources are of a very diverse character. 
Apart from European directives (and possibly regulations in the years to come), European 
contract law is made up of national rules on contract law (from both the national legislators and 
courts), international conventions, case law of the ECJ and incidentally even of the ECHR, and a 
whole lot of other, more informal sources like commercial customary law, standardized general 
conditions, arbitral awards and standardised rules of professional organizations like the 
International Chamber of Commerce. This variety of sources is not represented adequately by any 
generalising approach and in particular not by laying down the present state of the law in static 
principles – even if these are ‘designed to provide maximum flexibility and thus to accommodate 
future developments’, as the drafters of the PECL state.32 Looking at principles as able to replace 
Europe’s national legal systems is adhering to the view that principles are the best way to 
describe the law. This may be true for some European systems, but definitely not for all. It is in 
any event not true for English law.33 
 
2.5 Fourth Diverging Tendency: Multiculturalism 
 
Finally, I hint at a fourth tendency of divergence. It is that today’s Europe is not only diverse as to 
the different legal systems that are part of it, but that also within the Member States, the concepts 
of fairness and law many times differ. I am referring to the fact that as a result of immigration of 
large groups of foreigners over the last decades, there are now within the European Union many 
different ethno-cultural groups with their own views of what is fair. This does not only apply to 
family law, but also to the law of contract: there is an Islamic view of when contracts should be 
                                                   
31 Here, I agree with Teubner, (1998) 61 MLR 11, who suggests that the dividing lines in the law of Europe 
should not be the national frontiers, but the production regimes. 
32 O. Lando/H. Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II, Combined and Revised, 
The Hague: Kluwer Law International (2000), xxvii. 
33 For an elaborated version of this argument, see J.M. Smits, The Good Samaritan in European Private 
Law, Deventer: Kluwer (2000). 
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binding and why this is so (just as there is a common law- and a civil law view). Fairness 
nowadays is a pluralistic concept, or as Michael Walzer puts it:34 
 
‘There is no single set of primary or basic goods conceivable across all moral and material worlds 
– or, any such set would have to be conceived in terms so abstract that they would be of little use 
in thinking about particular distributions’. 
 
The making of general principles, destined to govern all these different sets, is not in line with 
this cultural diversity. This has for a practical consequence that a future European Contract Law 
has to take these differences into account. The imposing of principles cannot contribute to this 
goal since principles are inherently unable to represent diversity, unless they are indeed – as 
Walzer puts it – ‘abstract.’ 
 
3. Consequences of Divergence for the Debate on European Contract Law 
 
What does the above imply for the debate on the future of European contract law? In this section, 
I will focus on what a European contract law should definitely not be.35 In the following section, I 
will investigate whether the option of an Optional Code will do justice to the present state of 
affairs in European contract law. 
 All the tendencies sketched in the above lead away from a generalised approach toward 
contract law. Drafting principles36 is an example of this generalised approach; the work done 
within the study group on a European civil code37 is another example. In my view, in the light of 
the present divergence in contract law, principles are too abstract to build a European private law 
with. The drafting of European principles inherently forces us to leave out as many differences 
between the national legal systems as is reasonably possible with the consequence that they do 
not give us much information anymore on what the European position actually is. They conceal 
the present divergence. 
This analysis of for example the Principles of European Contract Law can be supported 
by philosophical insights. Presenting law through principles is what Clifford Geertz has called a 
‘skeletonization of fact’: moral dilemmas are reduced to abstractions. Legrand rightly quotes 
Friedman where he says that to reduce the law in this way is very much like the work of the old 
system builders that ‘took fields of living law, scalded off their flesh, drained off their blood, and 
reduced them to bones’.38 Many details (that actually amount to national practical wisdom) are 
thus left out in an exercise that is primarily concerned with looking for consensus: making 
common principles is inherently a quest for the common denominator. This approach seems to 
have become the prevailing one of some leading comparatists. The well-known textbook of 
Zweigert and Kötz indeed departs from this ‘praesumptio similitudinis’: in their functional 
approach, the comparatist can only be satisfied if his research leads to the conclusion that the 
systems he has compared reach the same or similar practical results.39 From a pure scholarly point 
of view, there is nothing wrong with this because it may indeed help us to better understand the 
law. But if these principles or ‘similar results’ are subsequently used in a political way and pre-
                                                   
34 M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice: a Defense of Pluralism and Equality, New York: Basic Books (1983), 8. 
35 The following is partly based on Smits (Fn. 33). 
36 Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Rome: Unidroit (1994); Lando/Beale (Fn. 
32); G. Gandolfi (ed.), Code Européen des contrats, Milano: Giuffre (2001). 
37 On which Chr. Von Bar, ‘Le Groupe d’Études sur un Code Civil Européen’, Revue Internationale de Droit 
Comparé (RIDC) 2001, 127. 
38 Friedman, as cited in P. Legrand, ‘Against a European Civil Code’, (1997) 60 MLR, 44, 59. 
39 K. Zweigert/H. Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd. ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press (1998), 40. 
 7
scribed to national communities (where they replace national legal systems), the warning of Paul 
Feyerabend becomes of paramount importance:40 
 
‘A society that is based on a set of well-defined and restrictive rules, so that being human becomes 
synonymous with obeying these rules, forces the dissenter into a no-man’s-land of no rules at all 
and thus robs him of his reason and his humanity (…). Remove the principles, admit the 
possibility of many different forms of life’. 
 
The principles approach is thus directed toward the finding of an intermediate position. It may 
very well not be the best possible rule that prevails, but the rule on which consensus can be 
reached, indeed leaving out the ‘flesh and blood’ of national legal systems.41 
Here, it is important to note that the present indeterminacy of national contract law at the 
level of rules (the too general character of contract law) does not prevent the national courts from 
doing justice on the basis of the value judgments (the ‘national morality’) that underpin each 
national private law system. These judgments should – in the end – be decisive for the outcomes 
that the courts reach. And in national legal systems, they probably are decisive, because of the 
simple fact that the courts are aware of their own national culture (if you like: morality, 
Volksgeist or mentalité) in which the rules are embedded. That these judgments often do not come 
to the surface on the level of the black letter law, does in this respect not pose a true danger for 
the parties’ interests (although it is a danger from a viewpoint of a transparent and consistent 
national private law). This is different however if the private law rules are cut loose from their 
national cultural embedment and presented as European principles that are presented as being 
able to replace national systems. Such a venture can only be undertaken if the distilling of 
common denominators goes hand in hand with the development of a uniform European 
mentality.42 
 To sum up: replacing national legal systems with European principles will not lead to 
unification, but will most probably have the opposite effect. National experience in adjudicating 
cases will be destroyed, leaving national legal practice with no other alternative but to apply 
abstract norms in a European legal culture that it probably does not know and that possibly not 
exists. This can only have adverse effects on legal certainty and legal unity in Europe. Thus, there 
will only be unification at the abstract level (providing us with a ‘thin description’), not in 
practice itself. This implies that the option of creating a binding Code that would replace existing 
national law,43 has to be rejected at all times (and regardless the way in which it will be 
implemented: through a directive, regulation or treaty). 
 
4. The Importance of an Optional Code: Toward a Multi-Layered Contract Law 
 
Now that the combination of imposition and general principles has been characterised as a fatal 
one in the European context, the question is which of the options envisaged by the European 
Commission is most in accordance with the state of present day contract law in Europe. The goal 
is to create more uniformity than there is right now, but still to take into account the diverging 
tendencies. In itself, the envisaged option I of the Communication (no EC action at all44) could 
satisfy this goal, be it that there should then be more information available about the various 
                                                   
40 P. Feyerabend, Against Method, 3rd ed., London: Verso (1993), 162 et seq. 
41 R. Hyland, ‘Comparative Law’, in: D. Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal 
Theory, Cambridge Mass.: Blackwell (1996), 190, calls this ‘reductionism’. 
42 Cf. P. Legrand, ‘Against a European Civil Code’, (1997) 60 MLR , 44, 60: ‘What point, then, is a unitary 
text of reference in the absence of a unitary rationality and morality to underwrite and effectuate it?’ And 
see Smits (Fn. 33), making reference to a ‘programme’. 
43 COM (2001) 398 final, 17. 
44 COM (2001) 398 final, 13. 
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European legal systems, as well as the possibility for the contracting parties to choose freely from 
these systems. Under those two conditions, the market could indeed lead to more uniformity than 
there is right now, while retaining national legal culture45 and thus allowing divergence to remain 
intact. This option is not incompatible with the envisaged option II to promote the development of 
contract law principles as a source of soft law only. If principles are only used as a checklist, a 
source of inspiration, a set of rules that parties can adopt or as a language for communication,46 
diversity is not hampered either. 
 It is however to be foreseen that, from a political perspective, the European Commission 
will go further than only option I or II. I predict that in particular option IV (to adopt new 
comprehensive legislation at EC level) will play a big role in the future discussion. Since in my 
view such a new set of rules should never entirely replace national legal systems, the answer to 
the question whether an optional Code belongs to the possibilities is important. Can such a code 
be accommodated within present-day contract law and, if so, in what way? 
 In the Communication, several scenarios regarding an optional Code are sketched.47 The 
parameters are the following. First, the degree of bindingness may differ from a purely optional 
model by way of a recommendation or a regulation that has to be explicitly chosen by the parties 
to a model that applies unless it is excluded by the parties. Second, the contents of the Optional 
Code may differ from a set of provisions on contract law in general (I would think of a set like the 
PECL) to a set of provisions on specific contracts or containing other specific rules. Third, an 
Optional Code could be optional because it can be chosen by the Member States or by the 
contracting parties (variable factor of who is opting in). I could imagine that still a fourth variable 
factor (not mentioned in the Communication) would be brought in: the set could contain rules 
only on international contracts, but also on purely domestic ones (variable factor of which 
contracts are covered). This is represented in scheme 1. 
 
 
 Scheme 1    
 WHO OPTS IN TO WHAT TYPE OF SET COVERING WHICH CONTRACTS  
1 Member States Set of general principles All contracts  
     
     
2 Member States Set of general principles International contracts only  
     
     
3 Member States Sets of specific contract rules All contracts  
     
     
4 Member States Sets of specific contract rules International contracts only  
     
     
5 Contracting Parties Set of general principles All contracts  
     
     
6 Contracting Parties Set of general principles International contracts only  
     
                                                   
45 For an elaboration of this argument, but focusing on the courts to choose freely, see J.M. Smits, ‘A 
European Private Law as a Mixed Legal System’, (1998) 5 MJ 328. 
46 Cf. M. Hesselink, The Principles of European Contract Law: Some Choices Made By The Lando 
Commission, Deventer: Kluwer (2001), 25. 
47 COM (2001) 398 final, 16 et seq. 
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7 Contracting Parties Sets of specific contract rules All contracts  
     
     
8 Contracting Parties Sets of specific contract rules International contracts only  
     
     
 
 
Generally speaking, the big advantage of an optional Code is that it can take into account the 
present divergence in contract law, while still allowing further unification to take place as far as 
the market parties wish to. Much depends, however, upon the exact combination of the variable 
factors. If an optional Code would exist only of general principles after the model of the PECL, 
the success of an optional Code would be minimal, both in the case of Member States as in the 
case of contracting parties opting in to such a Code. If Member States would opt in, the national 
wisdom as to solving concrete cases would to a large extent disappear. These principles can after 
all only be of a general nature. In the context of an optional Code, I do not see any point in the 
Member States deciding for the contracting parties what the law should be. If, on the other hand, 
it were left to the contracting parties to opt in to rather general principles after the model of the 
PECL, I do not think this is going to happen much in practice. The effectiveness of such a new set 
of rules would be minimal if compared to national legal systems that are chosen in present day 
practice. More probably, parties would continue to make a choice for a specific national legal 
system (like English law), on which there is experience as to how it works in practice. 
 In case there would be a choice for a more specific set of contract law rules (or rather 
several of such sets), this may be different. One of these sets could consist of rules on consumer 
contracts (of course incorporating the European directives in the field), another set could consist 
of rules on commercial contracts while a third set could envisage codifying a specific ‘non-
Western’ contract view. Thus, several sets of rules would consist next to each other in line with 
the divergence sketched in section 3 of this paper. These sets should preferably be chosen by the 
contracting parties as governing their contract, alongside with more specific provisions that 
govern their contract more specifically. If it were left to the Member States to opt in, the dividing 
lines in European contract law would still run parallel to the national frontiers, while they should 
instead be in accordance with the different types of contract in Europe. As to the contracts 
covered, it would be best not to distinguish between purely domestic and transfrontier contracts if 
one’s goal is to create as much uniformity as possible in view of the diverging tendencies 
sketched. In scheme 1, option 7 would then be preferred. 
 This view stresses the importance of divergence, but also makes use of it to codify the 
separate parts of contract law along the previously sketched lines of divergence. This will result 
in a multi-layered law of contract for Europe,48 not only at the level of the contents of the rules, 
but also as to the way contract law and the optional Code are structured. Several layers will exist 
next to each other with possibly one overriding layer of mandatory law (that in my view will 
mostly be of national origin: harmonisation of mandatory law is already highly difficult because 
of its relationship with public law aspects of national legal systems). This multi-layered structure 
reflects the pluralism in the private law of Europe much better than any approach that seeks to 
find general principles of contract law. 
 
                                                   
48 For a similar plea for legal systems as ‘multi-level frameworks’, see M. Bussani, ‘”Integrative” Com-
parative Law Enterprises and the inner Stratification of Legal Systems’, (2000) ERPL, 85. 
